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Abstract 
Several conurbations in Latin America have implemented policies to restrict the use of private cars by prohibiting those with a license 
plate number ending on some digit, which vary each day, from circulating on that weekday. These policies have been formulated as a 
“second best” option to congestion charging as the latter policy has been deemed politically unfeasible so far. The idea underlying license 
plate restrictions is very simple: by not allowing a proportion of the total number of vehicles to circulate on a given day, congestion 
levels and other externalities are expected to decrease, improving the quality of life for people. 
Based on a simple microeconomic analysis, supported by a review of the literature and by evidence collected in several cities where these 
restrictions have been implemented, it is concluded that the policy is apparently effective only in the very short-term, but ultimately it 
fails to achieve its objectives and usually leads to a worse outcome. 
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Restricción vehicular según número de patente: Una política de 
transporte errónea 
 
Resumen 
Varias ciudades latinoamericanas han implementado políticas restrictivas al uso de vehículos particulares consistentes en prohibir su 
circulación según el número de su patente o placa. La política ha sido planteada como una alternativa de segunda mejor, al cargo por 
congestión; este último consiste en el cobro directo de la externalidad a los usuarios de vías congestionadas, pero es considerado 
políticamente inviable en la actualidad en muchos casos. La idea detrás de la restricción según patente es muy simple: al restringir una 
proporción del parque automotor se disminuye los niveles de congestión y otras externalidades negativas, especialmente las ambientales, 
mejorando la calidad de vida de las personas. 
A través de un sencillo análisis microeconómico, apoyado en evidencia recogida en algunas ciudades donde se ha implementado esta 
política, se demuestra que sólo puede funcionar en el muy corto plazo y, finalmente, no logra el objetivo deseado en el largo plazo. 
 
Palabras clave: Restricción vehicular; externalidades; políticas urbanas. 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Cities in the developing world have been experiencing a 
rapid increase in motorization. To deal with the growing 
congestion, smog, and other externalities associated with 
urban transport, it has become common for some 
conurbations in Latin America to restrict the use of private 
cars, by prohibiting vehicles with license plate numbers 
ending with certain pre-specified digits from circulating on 
certain days of the week. In Santiago de Chile, since 1986, 
vehicles lacking catalytic converters have been subject to 
this restriction during the autumn and winter periods. More 
recently, this restriction has also applied to vehicles with 
catalytic converters on emergency days [1]. In 1989, the 
government of Mexico City introduced the Hoy No Circula 
(which roughly translates as "Do Not Circulate Today") 
program, which bans drivers from using their cars on one 
day of the week also based on the last digit of the cars' 
license plate number; nowadays, a restriction is in force in 
the central zone of Mexico´s metropolitan area, where 20% 
of all vehicles concentrate daily. In Colombia, Bogotá 
instituted the vehicular restriction known as Pico y Placa 
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(which roughly translates as "Peak and Plate") in 1998. But, 
unlike the previous cities' restrictions, this measure was a 
response to traffic congestion and not to poor air quality [2].  
The measure has been extended to other Colombian cities, 
including Medellín in 2005. 
Outside Latin America, Manila has had a license plate 
number restriction in place for some time prohibiting certain 
vehicles from circulating on high traffic arteries during the 
rush hour [3]. An interesting case is the special odd–even 
license plate restriction that was used in Beijing during the 
2008 Olympic Games where an evident reduction of 
congestion and mobile source pollution was confirmed 
during this period [4]. The benefits of such restriction 
seemed so attractive that authorities decided to resume it 
with a similar, but less restrictive, one-day-a-week licensing 
scheme, which stops 20% of private vehicles from using 
roads on weekdays. 
According to local planners and politicians, the policy 
constitutes a second best alternative to congestion charging 
(which entails directly charging drivers using congested 
roads for a specific externality) [5], as any class of road 
pricing has been considered politically unfeasible so far. 
The virtues of this simple policy include its acceptance by 
large sectors of society, especially those who do not own 
cars (i.e. the majority of Latin Americans). Furthermore, as 
a result of the restriction it is expected that some drivers 
may experiment with using public transport and this is 
clearly a desirable effect. 
Nevertheless, several disadvantages associated with this 
measure have also been identified, including the increase in 
automobile stock due to the fact that drivers with sufficient 
purchasing power tend to buy a second vehicle (often more 
polluting), the increase in the number of trips by taxi and 
motorbike, the risk of fraud inherent to the policy (such as 
counterfeit license plates), and the difficulty of dealing with 
exceptions provided for certain types of vehicles, people, or 
organizations [2]. The literature has examined consumer 
behavior in relation to these measures; for example, 
Wang et al. [6] used revealed preference data in Beijing 
to examine compliance with the measure, finding that 
almost 48% of drivers did not comply.  
In this paper we conduct a detailed analysis of the 
vehicular restriction policy based on license plate numbers. 
We perform a complete review of the literature and also 
evaluate the policy's short- and long-term effects. Our 
evaluation is supported by empirical evidence from Latin 
American cities where the restriction has been applied for 
many years. 
 
2.  Economic analysis of license plate restriction policies 
 
Being a market with strong externalities is one of 
transport's most relevant characteristics, especially in urban 
areas. In simple terms, an externality is an action carried out 
by an economic agent (company or individual) that has a 
direct impact upon the productive processes of another 
company and/or the well-being of another individual. 
Transport supply is associated with concomitant effects that 
introduce distortions, such as congestion, accidents, noise 
and air pollution, including the emission of global 
greenhouse gases resulting in a rise in global temperature 
and climate change. A troubling aspect of externalities from 
the transport sector is that they are increasing rapidly in 
Latin America and other developing countries where, with 
the ongoing rapid increase in population, expansion of 
middle class, and availability of cheaper vehicles, the 
always present desire to own private vehicles is more within 
reach now than ever for millions of people. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the economic analysis of externalities 
related to transport. For the sake of simplicity, we shall 
consider just one origin and a destination connected by a 
road on which individuals travel in identical vehicles in 
static equilibrium [7]. Therefore, we are ignoring other 
effects such as a redistribution of trips to other modes of 
transport (in the case of compulsory trips) or to other 
days, in the case of non-compulsory trips. Neither are we 
including induced demand by users with a right to 
circulate taking advantage of the improved flow 
conditions in the short term. Moreover, the traffic flow, 
speed, and density are the same all along the road. The 
horizontal axis indicates the volume of traffic flow (v), 
while the vertical axis represents the generalized cost of the 
trip (C), which includes operational costs, travel time, and 
other charges. When traffic volumes are low, vehicles can 
travel at their desired speeds (i.e. free flow). When flows (v) 
increase, congestion arises, the speed of traffic decreases, 
and costs also increase. In this model we are not considering 
other effects such as mode changes and redistribution of 
trips. 
The model proposed is a static analysis of congestion. In 
Fig. 1, the AvC(v) curve represents the average (or private) 
costs perceived by drivers and the MgC(v) curve represents 
the marginal (or social) costs; both costs are related by 
equation (1), where the second term on the right represents 
the externalities; i.e., the (marginal) social costs are the 
(average) private costs plus the externalities. 
 
     AvC vMgC v AvC v v
v
    
(1) 
 
If we interpret the flow volume as the number of trips 
demanded per unit of time, then we obtain the demand 
curve and the supply-demand diagram shown in Fig. 1, 
where D1 is defined as the initial demand. If there is no 
intervention or any additional charge to the operational 
costs and travel times, then we obtain the initial market 
equilibrium at flow Vm; the generalized private costs are 
expressed as GCpM, and the social costs as GCsM. The 
figure also shows that the social optimum, which 
corresponds to the intersection of the demand curve and the 
social costs, should take place when the equilibrium flow is 
VO and social costs are GCsO. 
To reach the social optimum it is necessary to charge an 
amount E (equal to the congestion externality), as the 
market equilibrium subtracts a social loss (black area) from 
the social benefit (lightly shaded area). The philosophy 
underlying the congestion charge policy is to reach an 
equilibrium corresponding to the social optimum. The 
policy has been successfully implemented in cities such as 
London, Singapore, and Stockholm [8]. However, as it is a  
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 Figure 1. Market equilibrium and social optimum in a congested road.  
Source: Adapted from Lindsey, R. and Verhoef, E. 2001 
 
 
 Figure 2: Equilibrium after applying the restriction policy.  
Source: Own drawing 
 
 
supply oriented measure which entails charging drivers, it 
has not yet proven possible to implement it in Latin 
America (and in developing countries in general), as it is 
perceived as politically unfeasible [9]. 
In some cities decision makers have preferred restrictive 
circulation measures applied to demand. The logic of the 
implementation is very simple: move the demand curve in 
order to achieve a new equilibrium with lower costs. As 
shown in Fig. 2, the license plate restriction measure moves 
the demand curve to position D2 toward the left of the 
original curve D1. For our analysis, we shall assume the 
most favorable of circumstances, in which the movement is 
such that the new market equilibrium, which corresponds to 
a private cost GCpM, leads to a flow that is identical to the 
social optimum, i.e., VO. In other words, we shall assume 
that there is no need to implement the apparently unfeasible 
congestion charge in order to achieve flows similar to those 
that would have been achieved with this optimal policy. 
However, a more detailed analysis of the measure shows 
that the effect is not the same. We know that the demand 
curve reflects consumers' willingness to pay, such that, their 
inability to use their vehicles generates a social loss; this is 
represented by the darkly shaded area between curves D1 
and D2. We must remember that the equilibrium described 
relates to the short-term. 
In the long-term car users take decisions that change the 
aforementioned equilibrium as illustrated in Fig. 3. There is 
a willingness to pay among drivers for using their cars, 
reflected in the area corresponding to the social loss. A large 
number of car users express this willingness by purchasing a 
second or third car, with license plate numbers that are not 
restricted on the same days as the other car(s) they own. 
Accordingly, the demand curve stubbornly moves to the 
right until say position D3, which can, even in a short period 
of time, coincide with or even be more to the right of D1, 
thus returning to a situation similar to or worse than the 
initial situation (remember that the vehicles that enter the 
system in this manner are neither new nor in optimal 
condition, as they are only sporadically used.). 
Clearly, in time the desired effects are lost both with 
respect to congestion and pollution. This latter issue is 
exacerbated by the fact that, as pointed out earlier, not only 
do new vehicles enter the system but also older and more 
polluting vehicles which are cheaper to acquire as 
“replacement cars”. In fact, such vehicles are generally 
purchased by people who lack the disposable income 
needed to buy a new second car. Another aggravating effect 
is that all these families, once they buy their second car, 
tend to use both of them on days where neither of the 
vehicles is restricted. This is confirmed by the noticeable 
increase in car flows on Saturdays and Sundays, and at the 
hours during which the restriction does not apply. 
It is worth mentioning that prior to their implementation 
these restrictive measures received, in all cases, strong 
opposition from automobile users and certain business 
guilds (especially merchants). However, they were 
ultimately accepted thanks to their apparent initial success. 
Nevertheless, with time these initial benefits have become 
less clear largely because of an increase in automobile 
stock. In response to this, the authorities have tended to 
make the measures even harsher in some places by 
increasing the license plate numbers subject to the 
restriction on a given day, extending the hours during which 
the restriction applies, or eliminating exceptions. On the 
other hand, cities commonly rotate the days on which 
certain license plate numbers are restricted. 
 
3.  Ex-post evaluation of the policy in Latin American 
cities 
 
Various research projects support the thesis that 
congestion charging (i.e., road pricing) is more efficient 
than draconian measures, such as prohibiting circulation 
based on license plate numbers [10]; this is because car 
users can keep driving by paying the externality and the 
income generated from road pricing can be used for a 
variety of purposes, such as, for example, substantially 
improving public transport services (as has occurred in  
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 Figure 3: Long-term equilibrium after applying the vehicular restriction. 
Source: Own drawing 
 
 
London). We show below that the evidence from four cities 
where cars are restricted based on license plate numbers: 
Santiago (Chile), México City, Medellín and Bogotá, 
supports this view. 
This analysis is also supported by recent research on 
vehicle restriction and data from various sources in the 
cities considered. The main variables analysed are pollutant 
emissions, changes in car registrations and car flow 
measurements. Unfortunately, the available information is 
not the same in all cases making it difficult to build 
homogeneous indicators. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
derive general conclusions on the implementation of the 
policy. 
 
3.1.  Santiago, Chile 
 
Since 1986, in Santiago, which has suffered intense 
pollution problems due to its geographical setting, during 
autumn and winter (where a thermal inversion problem sets 
in) vehicles lacking catalytic converters have been subject 
to a restriction based on the last digit of their license plate 
numbers. In the last decade, this restriction has also applied 
to vehicles with catalytic converters on emergency days. 
Originally the latter measure applied to 20% of these cars, 
but in 2008 it was increased to 40% of the fleet. 
Fresard [11] investigated the real effects of the vehicular 
restriction in Santiago. He found that an important 
disadvantage was that it did not distinguish between drivers 
with different income levels who obviously ascribed 
different subjective values to time; thus, higher income 
drivers simply used less polluting cars that were 
unrestricted. Another, more undesirable consequence, was 
that a large proportion of families purchased a second car in 
order to avoid the restriction. Moreover, these second cars 
were in most cases older and more polluting than the 
families' first cars. 
Based on the traffic capacities at periods corresponding 
to different vehicular restriction conditions (i.e. whether 2, 
4, or 6 digits were subject to restriction), Fresard [11] 
concluded that there was no noticeable effect between the 
restrictions for two or four digits although a 10% decrease 
was expected. Also, when the restriction was extended from 
two to six digits, the average reduction observed only 
slightly surpassed 5% (although a 20% reduction was 
expected). Another interesting fact is that the measure had a 
lesser effect upon higher income automobile users. His 
conclusions were that the measure has been ineffective (i.e., 
it did not achieve the desired effects) as people found ways 
to avoid it, such as buying a second car. Finally, people's 
travel habits underwent changes reflected by the fact that 
some choose to travel at different hours; but the increased 
flows during hours when the restriction did not apply were 
also due to the fact that people started to move 
spontaneously away from the more congested times. 
A paper by De Grange and Troncoso [12] looked again 
at the effects of the two restrictions that have been applied 
in Santiago (i.e. the traditional measure applied from April 
through August to vehicles without catalytic converters and 
the additional measure that bans the use of vehicles with 
catalytic converters between 7:30 am and 9:00 pm on days 
declared as environmental ‘‘pre-emergencies’’); they 
conclude that the traditional restriction has had no impact on 
the use of private cars while the additional restriction 
curtailed their use only by 5.5% when the restriction applied 
to 20% of cars. 
 
3.2.  Mexico City 
 
Similar to the case of Santiago, car restrictions in 
Mexico City were motivated by environmental reasons. 
Davis [13] analyzed the effect of the restriction 
implemented in 1989 (Hoy No Circula) on air quality, by 
making high frequency measurements at several monitoring 
stations. His work shows no evidence that the restriction 
improved air quality; furthermore, it reveals that the 
restriction undoubtedly led to an increase in the number of 
vehicles in circulation and to a shift in the composition of 
the automobile stock towards more polluting vehicles from 
other cities. Also, his analysis shows that there was a 
relative increase in air pollution and noise on weekends and 
during the hours of the day when the restriction did not 
apply. Moreover, while it was expected that the program 
would encourage drivers to use low-emission means of 
transport, contrary evidence was found suggesting that 
drivers tended to use taxis when they could not use their 
cars. 
To analyze the effects of the Hoy no Circula (HNC) 
policy on car use, Gallego et al. [14] developed a (linear-
city) model that captures in a simple way two essential 
elements of the problem: the allocation of existing vehicle 
capacity to competing uses (peak vs. off-peak hours) and 
how that capacity is adjusted in response to a policy shock, 
because their short and long run effects can vary widely 
(i.e., whether and how fast households adjust their vehicle 
stock). They argue that, potentially, the driving restriction 
can also have a positive effect on car travel in the long-run 
giving that for some households owning a car is not that 
attractive any more (although using it, is). However, other 
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households will find attractive to increase the size of their 
car-bundle and buy a second car; not only by-passing the 
driving restriction altogether but, what is worse, increasing 
car travel during both peak and off-peak. Obviously, the 
increase in stock is much larger as only few households 
consider the possibility of selling their cars because of the 
policy. 
Clearly, then, in a short amount of time the desired 
effects of the policy are lost both with respect to congestion 
and pollution. This latter issue is exacerbated by the fact 
that, as pointed out earlier, not only do new vehicles enter 
the system as usual but also, as an effect of the policy, older 
and more polluting vehicles enter the system too, usually 
from other cities. Such vehicles are generally purchased by 
people who lack the disposable income needed to buy a new 
second car. Another aggravating effect is that all these 
families, once they buy their second car, tend to use both 
vehicles on days where neither of them is restricted. 
Likewise, there is a noticeable increase in car flows on 
Saturdays and Sundays, and at the hours during which the 
restriction does not apply. 
Other empirical results for HNC [14] show statistically 
significant reductions of CO in the short run (i.e., during the 
first month of implementation), of 11% and 8% for peak 
and off-peak hours, respectively. This short-run result is 
entirely consistent with the perception that compliance with 
the program has always been high. In the longer run though 
(i.e., after the first year of implementation), estimates show 
an increase of 13% during peak hours and of 8% during of 
off-peak hours. On the other hand, estimates for weekends 
show no reduction in the short-run, as expected, and a 
significant increase in the long run of 14%. These results are 
consistent with the fact that the policy effectively 
constrained week days only; hence, a strong immediate 
effect should be seen in peak hours and no effect during 
weekends. Additionally, the results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that in the margin households will tend to buy 
cars to try and return to their pre-policy use in the peak, but 
this behaviour will leave them with additional cars to use 
during weekends and, eventually, off-peak hours. This, in 
turn, should increase pollution and congestion during such 
hours. 
Similar evidence was found by Eskeland and Feyzioglu 
[15], who demonstrated that the ban restricting cars from 
circulating on a specified weekday had increased total 
driving in Mexico City. Because of the ban, cars effectively 
represented “driving permits,” and some households just 
bought an additional one and increased their total driving. 
Greater use of old cars, congestion effects, and increased 
weekend driving may also have contributed to the 
disappointing results. The ban has high welfare costs and 
does not deliver the intended benefits of reduced driving—
quite the contrary. Conclusions were founded in the 
estimation of a demand function based on time series, 
aggregate data, to analyze the aggregate reductions in 
driving resulting from the driving ban. The time series 
analysis indicated, strongly, that total car use in Mexico 
City shifted upwards as a consequence of the regulation, 
suggesting that positive net car purchases should play a 
major role (since one would expect the many households  
Table 1.  
Effect of car restriction on variation of car ownership in Mexico City 
(annual average). 
Indicator 
Before 
Regulation 
Under 
Regulation 
1983-89  1990-93 
Sales of new vehicles   Mexico City  80 154 
 (thousands)                  Rest of Mexico  127 237 
Increase in vehicles     Mexico City  7 239 
registered (thousands)  Rest of Mexico 174 250 
Net import of vehicles  Mexico City  -74 85 
(thousands)                   Rest of Mexico 47 13 
GDP (%  growth)        Mexico City  1.1 3.8 
                                    Whole country  1.1 4.2 
Metro ridership in Mexico 
City(percentage growth) 5.7 -2.4 
Source: Asociación Mexicana de la Industria Automotriz and Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, cited by [15] 
 
 
Table 2.  
Evolution of mode share in Mexico City. 
Mode 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 
Bus/Minibus 48.2 47.8 53.6 59.7 55.0 
Taxi 5.0 5.0 5.9 8.2 8.5 
Car 23.0 24.9 16.4 17.8 22.2 
Light Rail - Trolley 1.7 3.2 3.1 1.1 1.2 
Metro 22.1 19.1 21.0 13.2 13.1 
Source: Cometravi, 1999. [16]  
 
 
that would not increase car ownership to reduce, or keep 
unchanged, their car use).  
Aggregate annual data presented in Table 1 support 
these conclusions; it shows that car restrictions turned 
Mexico City from net used car exporter (exporting an 
average of 74,000 cars per year) to importer (importing an 
average of 84,000 cars per year). Table 1 also indicates that 
after regulation ridership of the metro system declined. It is 
worth indicating that although the average increase in gross 
domestic product of Mexico City was higher than in the rest 
of the country during the years following the 
implementation of the car restriction, this fact does not fully 
explain the changes listed. On the other hand, Table 2 
shows the evolution of mode share in Mexico City. It is 
evident with when HNC was imposed, in 1989, car´s market 
share decreased; however, few years after, car users 
increase to original levels.   
HNC results are consistent in showing how rapidly 
households adjust their vehicle stocks leaving little room for 
policy makers to make ex-post adjustments to policies It is 
clear that this policy was ineffective in moving people away 
from their cars and reducing pollution, but it is less clear 
how much of that result can be exported to other driving 
restriction programs including elements that this one did not 
include, at least in their early years of implementation (i.e., 
incentives towards a faster and cleaner fleet turnover). 
 
3.3.  Bogotá 
 
Innovative policies have been implemented in Bogotá to 
transform a car-centred transportation system into a people-
oriented one. In addition to innovative strategic urban 
planning, a successful BRT system of three trunk lines 
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(Transmilenio) and strong support for the use of bicycles, the 
city implemented a vehicular restriction system called “pico y 
placa” in 1998. The Office of the Mayor decided to restrict 
automobile use at rush hours depending on the cars' license 
plate numbers. So, initially, 20% of cars could not circulate 
between 7:00 and 9:00 am and between 5:30 and 7:30 pm on 
week days. In 2002 the ban was increased to 40% of cars and 
set from 6:30 to 9:00 and from 17:00 to 19:00. In 2005 it was 
increased to 6:00 to 9:00 am and 4:00 to 7:30 pm and since 
2009 the restriction spans almost the whole day, from 6:00 to 
20:00 hrs. Although the measure was proposed as a 
provisional one, it ended up being adopted permanently by 
subsequent Mayors. Unlike Mexico City and Santiago, the 
main motivation for its implementation was congestion, but it 
was also supported for environmental reasons. 
Unfortunately, the Office of the Mayor did not 
implement a monitoring system for determining the 
measure's impact on traffic. So, there are no systematic 
measures of average traffic speeds before and after the 
introduction of the policy. This lack of information makes it 
difficult to reach conclusions about certain essential topics, 
such as: (i) what exactly happened to the 40% of trips by car 
after the restriction took effect; (ii) which were the changes 
in the chosen modes of transport; (iii) which trips were no 
longer made, and (iv) did the hours during which e people 
travel changed. 
It does not seem correct to assume a reduction in the 
number of vehicles per km (veh/km) equal to the proportion 
of cars that ceased to circulate (40%). In fact, considering 
the transport cost flexibility vs. veh/km, it is very likely that 
some car drivers may have decided to drive more during 
times when their cars were not subject to restriction, given 
that the restriction may have temporarily reduced their 
generalized costs of trips by car. Based on an understanding 
of certain parameters reflecting the current situation (i.e., 
with the circulation restriction), especially those relating to 
speeds and road use, Bocarejo [17] examined the policy's 
economic impact, calculating the average generalized cost 
perceived by car users along with the social cost in 
situations with and without the restriction. He also evaluated 
the change in consumer surplus. The results of this analysis 
indicate that the circulation restriction during rush hours in 
Bogotá (before 2009) could have generated a loss in 
consumer utility (users) of some 118 million Euros/year. 
While the values of time and elasticities considered in the 
analysis may be improved in a more precise study, this 
result shows at least the potential harm that a policy of this 
nature can inflict to society. 
Fig. 4 shows (a) the evolution of new registered 
automobiles and (b) the evolution of GDP in Bogotá and in 
the rest of Colombia from 1998 (when Pico y Placa was 
implemented in Bogotá) to 2005 (when Pico y Placa was 
also implemented in other important cities like Medellín, 
Cali and Bucaramanga, involving about 75% of the cars in 
Colombia). The reference point is 1998, to which we 
assigned a value of 100 in both cases. 
Growth in car ownership is linked to an increase in 
income [19], and although Bogotá has a higher GDP per 
capita than the rest of Colombia, in the period analysed the 
capital experienced less growth in its GDP. Between 1998 
 Figure 4. Evolution of a) New cars registered and b) GDP in Bogotá and in 
the rest of Colombia. 
Source: Ministerio de Transporte and DANE [18] 
 
 
and 2001, a severe economic crisis reduced the number of 
automobile registrations, affecting Bogotá more; 
nevertheless, we can see that in the long term far more new 
vehicles entered the automobile stock in Bogotá than in the 
rest of the country during the years in which Pico y Placa 
has been in force (although tendencies in economic growth 
were comparable). It is important to mention that in these 
years no relevant changes in operational or acquisition car 
costs were observed. 
The short term impact of Pico y Placa on the mode 
share is evident in Table 3. Trips whose purpose was work 
and education decreased significantly when the policy was 
implemented. However, in the medium and long term as the 
table shows, trips in cars return to their original levels. 
Table 5 also shows the impact of the introduction of 
Transmilenio (by December 2000) on modal split. 
According to records of the Bogota air quality network, 
the main pollutant is PM10, which often exceeds the legal 
norm [20]. Fig. 5a) shows the PM10 annual percentage 
exceeding set limits (70μg/m3), calculated from the 
averages reported by the stations, while Fig. 5b) shows the 
overall averages for the city. It can be seen that with the 
introduction of the restriction in 1998 there was a decrease 
in the indicators for that pollutant, but a couple of years 
later it increased again. Similarly, extensions of the policy 
had marginal impacts on the PM10 levels. In 2002, 2005 
and 2009, the schedule of the restriction was increased, and 
the Fig. 5 shows that effect. 
Observations of classified ads for the sale of used vehicles 
in Bogotá let see that the last digit of the license plate number 
is an important decision-making factor. This provides a clear 
market signal. Individuals, particularly those who already own 
a car, consider the license plate number to be a relevant factor 
when deciding to buy a second-hand car in order to guarantee 
that the new vehicle and the car already owned will not be 
subject to restriction on the same days.  
 
Table 3.  
Evolution of mode share (%) in Bogotá. Trips with purpose work and 
education 
Mode 1998 2000 2002 
Bus 64 65 50 
Transmilenio NA NA 12 
Walking 7 12 12 
Car 17 12 14 
Bicycle 1 3 4 
Others 11 8 8 
Source: Bogotá Cómo vamos.2013 [21]  
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 Figure 5. Evolution of a) PM10 annual percentage exceeding legal limits; 
b) PM10 average in Bogotá.  
Source: Bogota air quality network 2009. [22]. 
 
 
 Figure 6. Evolution of cars registered in Medellin.  
Source: Ministerio de Transporte [25] 
 
 
3.4.  Medellin 
 
In a recent analysis of the evolution of the Pico y Placa 
policy, which began in 2005 in Medellin, Sarmiento and 
Zuleta [23] and Posada et al. [24] show that, as a result of 
the measure, the city no longer has clearly defined peak 
hours as before. This is because car users have moved many 
of their activities to hours during which the restriction does 
not apply. Furthermore, a before and after analysis of nine 
of the city's key intersections revealed that traffic flows 
during rush hours decreased during the first year that the 
measure was implemented (recall that it affected 20% of 
vehicles), but only two years later traffic flows were back to 
pre-measure levels. As a result, the traffic authorities 
extended the restriction to 40% of the vehicles and 20% of 
two-stroke engine motorcycles in 2008. 
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of registered vehicles in 
Medellín from 2003 (two years before Pico y Placa was 
implemented) to 2010; the reference point is 2004, to which 
we assigned a value of 100 It may be noted that after the 
implementation of the policy there was an increase in the 
rate of growth of automobile stock. 
Emissions measurements were also taken from 2004 to 
2007 at different stations in Medellin [26]. Table 4 shows 
the annual variation in airborne particulate matter (TSP), 
while Table 4 shows the same measurements for PM10 
particulate matter. In all cases, we can see that the 
implementation of the vehicular restriction in 2005 had a  
Table 4.  
Variation in concentration of airborne particulate matter (μg/m3) in 
Medellin 
Station 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Aguinaga 105 102 101 126 
Guayabal 105 98 101 105 
Politécnico 108 111 100 110 
UdeA 94 91 93 113 
Udn 80 75 79 85 
Unalmed 129 118 133 141 
Unibol 80 71 80 84 
Source: Metropolitan area of Medellín air quality monitoring network [19] 
 
 
Table 5.  
Variations in concentration of PM10 (μg/m3) in Medellin.  
Station 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Aguinaga 62 60 58 73 
Corantioquia 61 59 58 67 
Guayabal 68 63 63 65 
Source: Metropolitan area of Medellín air quality monitoring network [19]. 
 
 
positive short-term effect. Emissions decreased in the year 
following the policy's implementation, but its reduction was 
inferior to the percentage decrease in automobile stock 
affected (20%). However, only two years later all the 
indicators increased and even surpassed the levels prior to 
the introduction of the measure. This reveals that in the 
medium- and long-term, the policy's benefits were lost, as 
the real automobile stock actually increased. 
By analysing the traffic flows, Posada et al. [24] 
concluded that some car drivers initially re-scheduled their 
trips away from the peak hours as a consequence of the 
implementation of Pico y Placa in Medellín. However, the 
policy turned obsolete in only three years as a consequence 
on the growth in car ownership. They remark that in this 
case “the cure could be worse than the illness”. In the same 
line, Gonzalez-Calderon et al [27] show that “píco y placa” 
is only an inefficient palliative. They suggest the 
implementation of congestion pricing in Medellin as a 
strategy to improve the efficiency of the city´s road 
infrastructure 
 
4.  Discussion and conclusions 
 
We have analysed a policy, common to several Latin 
American cities, that involves prohibiting the circulation of 
a proportion of private cars based on their license plate 
numbers. This type of measure has been conceived as a way 
to reduce two of the most relevant urban transport 
externalities: congestion and air pollution. 
Diverse empirical evidence reveals that the measure 
involves a reduction in social benefits and that it only has 
apparently positive short-term effects (reduced travel costs 
and improved air quality). However, these disappear quite 
rapidly and the situation tends to get worse. The reason for 
this is, primarily, that a greater willingness-to-pay for 
driving among car users who are subject to the circulation 
prohibition, leads to their purchasing vehicles, both new and 
used (the latter are usually brought from other localities), 
that increase the city's automobile stock.  
The justification for restricting license plate numbers has 
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been centred upon the proposition that there is a general 
benefit (to society) that takes priority over individual 
benefits. However, our analysis reveals that, in reality, the 
approach produces a net loss to society. Worse still, upon 
discovering that the measure does not work as expected, 
local politicians and transport planners have tended to apply 
the prohibition to a larger share of the vehicle fleet and 
increase the hours during which the circulation restriction 
applies. We show that, fairly rapidly, these measures do not 
only cease to be effective, but also tend to exacerbate the 
negative results that had not been initially considered. 
One wonders why this measure is still in operation or 
being considered. An explanation is the short-term vision of 
local politicians. Transport authorities become hostage of 
the policy, fearing that if they disassemble it might lead to 
immediate demand growth. 
The transportation-related externalities in Latin 
American cities have become increasingly critical. 
Therefore, these cities must become bolder in terms of the 
transport policies they adopt. In Latin America's main cities, 
significant progress has been made in terms of public 
transport, zoning laws, and control over public space. So, 
the conditions are there for moving towards the necessary 
implementation of road pricing policies, which have had 
such good results in the developed world. 
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